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Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio:
The Emergence of the Right of Family
Choice in Zoning
INTRODUCTION
One's conception or inception into a family unit related either
by blood or adoption is generally not a product of one's own
choosing. Rather, the creation of such status is often left to the
discretion of others. Once an individual becomes integrated into
the "family realm" however, his decision to bring another into a
similar unit is protected by the fundamental right termed the
"right of family choice."
But this family choice, not solely limited to procreation, arises
in those instances in which the family invokes its very privilege
to interact as a family.
Examples of the "right of family choice" include the right to
live together as a family or apart, the right to educate the family
in a preferred manner, be it public or private, the right to pro-
selytize among the unit uniform religious beliefs or language,
the right to pass these ideals from one generation to another and
finally the very choice of procreation which itself determines
the recipients of family traditions and goals.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio exemplifies the Su-
preme Court's addition of yet another category of rights inuring
to the family by virtue of the "right of family choice" doctrine.
This newly created guarantee encompasses the right of a fami-
ly, albeit extended rather than nuclear, to live, grow and mature
in the same household.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As a result of violating a zoning ordinance of the City of East
Cleveland, a 63 year old grandmother, Mrs. Inez Moore, was
fined twenty-five dollars and sentenced to five days in jail.
Early in 1973, Mrs. Moore was given notice of non-compliance
with a city ordinance limiting occupancy of a single family
dwelling to individuals related by a particular degree of kin-
ship and was instructed to remedy her alleged violation. How-
ever, Mrs. Moore refused to do so since compliance meant the
exclusion from her home of the "illegal occupant", Mrs. Moore's
then 10 year old grandson John Moore Jr. Mrs. Moore was then
living with her son, Dale Moore Sr. and her grandsons, Dale
Moore Jr. and his cousin John Moore Jr. 1
Mrs. Moore's non-compliance resulted in the city filing crimi-
nal charges against her. She subsequently moved to dismiss the
criminal complaint, claiming that by violating her fourteenth
amendment rights, the statute was unconstitutional on its face.2
Such motion was dismissed and conviction ensued. The Ohio
Court of Appeals affirmed, followed by the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision to deny her review.3 The United States Su-
preme Court noted probable jurisdiction,4 and on May 31, 1977,
1. EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO, SECTION 1341.08 (1976) provides:
1. All citations by section number refer to the Codified Ordinances
of the City of East Cleveland, Ohio.
2. Section 1341.08 provides:
"Family" means a number of individuals related to the nominal
head of the household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the
household living as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling
unit, but limited to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of
the spouse of the nominal head of the household, provided however,
that such unmarried children have no children residing with them.(c) Father or Mother of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a fami-
ly may include not more than one dependent married or unmarried
child of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the
nominal head of the household and the spouse and dependent chil-
dren of such dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a
dependent person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total
support furnished for him by the nominal head of the household and
the spouse of the nominal head of the household.(e) A family may consist of one individual.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 read in part;
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
3. The question of Mrs. Moore's failure to seek a variance from the city as
bearing on her right to relief in the highest court was not discussed at length by
Justice Powell who delivered the judgment of the Court. However, Chief Justice
Burger's dissenting opinion, 97 S. Ct. 1947-1952, (1977), deals directly with the
problem of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Neither this dissent nor the
issue of exhaustion of remedies will be discussed in this casenote. However, for
a discussion of this procedural aspect see Scriven, Exhausting Administrative
and Legislative Remedies in Zoning Cases, 48 TUL. L. REV. 665-681 (1974).
4. 425 U.S. 949 (1976).
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reversed the Ohio court decisions in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio.
5
In its plurality decision, 6 the Supreme Court concluded that
the city zoning ordinance was in violation of certain rights
guaranteed to Mrs. Moore by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.' The Court's decision
was not premised upon precedent regarding zoning issues how-
ever. Such an approach was in fact rejected by the Court at the
outset8 thereby characterizing Moore as something other than
merely a zoning case.
Rather, the Supreme Court found support for its decision in
case law concentrating on the right of choice in matters
concerning marriage and family,9 since this was the gravamen
in Moore. The Court was not primarily concerned with the
municipality's right to regulate land use, but with its right to
regulate the family, for the effect of the zoning ordinance was
the internal disruption of the composition of the Moore family.
It would not be difficult, initially, to perceive Moore as noth-
ing more than a zoning case. Indeed, the zoning overtones of
Moore seem to present a somewhat common factual situation
which has, and in all probability will continue to be easily dis-
posed of in the lower state and federal courts. An aggrieved
property owner's objections to a municipality's attempt to regu-
late land use within its borders is perhaps as old as the first
zoning ordinance itself. 10
I. ZONING
Zoning has been defined as the legislative division of a com-
5. 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
6. Justice Powell, announcing the judgment of the Court, together with
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun rendered East Cleve-
land's ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed upon Mrs.
Moore's fundamental right of choice in family living arrangments evolving from
fourteenth amendment guarantees of "liberty." Justice Stevens, however, did
not feel that the Court need search that far and found that the ordinance was
irrational and an arbitrary taking of property without due process of law.
7. The decision of the Court was not predicated on any equal protection
grounds guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, although asserted by Mrs.
Moore. See note 3 supra, 97 S. Ct. at 1934.
8. Id. at 1935.
9. Id.
10. RATHKOPF, 1 THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 1-6 (4th ed. 1975).
munity into areas within which are permitted only certain desig-
nated uses of land or structures.1 Zoning is a device by which
the state seeks to regulate individual land use for the well-being
of all the land dwellers in the municipality.
The state derives such zoning authority from its police pow-
ers. 12 The ultimate and general purposes of zoning are those
traditionally associated with the police power, i.e., public health,
safety and morality as well as the general welfare, peace,
comfort and convenience of the citizenry. Zoning seeks to pro-
mote these goals by confining certain classes of buildings and
certain uses to defined areas.13
Use restrictions imposed by various zoning ordinances may
be classified into three types, any or all of which may be imple-
mented by the municipality.
First, (the ordinances) define the kind of structure that may be erected
on vacant land. Second, they require that a single-family home be
occupied only by a 'single housekeeping unit'. Third, they often re-
quire that the housekeeping unit be made up of persons related by
blood, adoption, or marriage, with certain limited exceptions. 4
When the individual landowner discovers that his property is
restricted as to its use he may challenge the municipality's zon-
ing ordinance on the ground that the manner in which his par-
ticular land is zoned represents a "taking", 15 either by decreased
value or a denial of a desired use. Such an allegation, however,
will generally be dismissed. Although the police power, as
manifested through the power to zone, represents "public en-
croachment upon private interests,"' 6 the good of the whole, as
opposed to the detriment of the few, vindicates zoning from
what might otherwise be an unconstitutional violation of per-
sonal property rights.
What the police power entails is relatively undefined. Limiting
boundaries of this somewhat nebulous power, however, do ex-
ist. More specifically the police power, in particular the zoning
power, must be exercised within the boundaries of reasonable-
ness. 17
11. MCQUILLAN, 8 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 21 (3d ed. rev. 1971).
12. Police power has been likened to a "residual sovereign power". Donald-
son, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land-The Need to Purge Natural
Law Constraints From the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV.
182, 196 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Donaldson)
13. MCQUILLAN, supra, note 11, at 43.
14. 97 S. Ct. at 1944.
15. Taking in this context is defined as a deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V § 1.
16. Donaldson, supra, note 12, at 196.
17. Id. at 196, "Except for ... familiar standards of reasonableness this
Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria."
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Reasonableness, as translated into constitutional terms, is ex-
amined through a rational basis test. That is, in the absence of
some fundamental right, 8 the state need only demonstrate that
the challenged ordinance is rationally related to some legitimate
state end.19
The legitimate state end uniformly asserted by the state in
zoning cases is the preservation of the public welfare as
achieved through the decreased congestion of the streets,2 in-
creased protection of the aesthetics of the environment,21 the
control of noise pollution 2 2 the control of population density,2 3
etc. If a zoning ordinance even hypothetically relates to and
serves that end, its validity will be upheld,24 for "... the law
18. Fundamental rights have been interpreted to include; the right to vote,
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right to terminate
pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); the right to travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to exercise of religion, Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); the right of privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
One of the ways in which this right has been defined is whether such a right "is
of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions . . ." 381 U.S. at 493.
When such a right is present, the State must come forth with a "compelling
interest" as to justify such an abridgment. The State has met this test only once
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
19. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1954), sets out this test
which in effect amounts to little or no test whatsoever:
It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it.
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws .... because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought.
20. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
21. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
22. Kirsh Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 245 A.2d 513,
515 (1971).
23. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
24. Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Municipality
Zoned Exclusively For Single Family Dwellings Promotes Valid Community
Objectives and Does Not Interfere with Right to Travel-Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), 2 FLA. ST. L. REV. 787, 793 (1974),
the courts, however, will not substitute their judgment for that of
the legislature when it is 'fairly debatable' whether the zoning ordinance
is an unreasonable exercise of the police power. Historically, therefore,
considerable deference has been accorded to legislative zoning determi-
nations.
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need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to
be constitutional.
'25
Since the courts generally apply only minimal standards of
reasonableness to zoning ordinances, instances of similar cases
involving this type of legislation reaching the United States
Supreme Court under claim of constitutional invalidity are
few.26
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,27 an early landmark zoning case
did reach the Supreme Court, however, in 1926.
The petitioner therein claimed that the city's zoning his prop-
erty as residential rather than its "highest and best use" as
industrial constituted a taking of property without the four-
teenth amendment guarantees of due process. The Court reject-
ed his claim with an opinion by Justice Sutherland which
continues to be the yardstick in constitutional determinations of
land use control. If the state should advance some form of
preservation of the public welfare as justification for its zoning
ordinances, a court will not question the validity of its motives
or rationale.
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wisdom or
sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indi-
cated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently
cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the
ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.2 8
Some fifty years later in 1974, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
this rationale in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,29 the last
zoning decision of the Court to preceed Moore.3" The peti-
tioner's claim therein, that a zoning ordinance prohibiting more
than two unrelated individuals from occupying a single-family
residence was violative of their fundamental rights of due proc-
ess and equal protection, was summarily dismissed by the
Court.31
25. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1954).
26. Only six zoning cases have been decided by the Supreme Court prior to
Moore. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Washington ex re
Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928); Goriech v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Public
Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1977); Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) taking case;
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
27. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
28. Id. at 395.
29. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
30. Belle Terre will be discussed at further length elsewhere in this case-
note.
31. 416 U.S. at 7.
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The Court in Belle Terre applied a rational basis test, effec-
tively ignoring the petitioner's assertion of fundamental rights
of association and privacy. It concluded that the ordinance bore
a rational relationship to some legitimate state end.32
The instant case therefore, came to a Court which for over a
half-century had,3 3 in nearly every instance,3 4 upheld the
constitutional validity of zoning ordinances by requiring little
more than an educated guess at what permissable goals the
legislature might have envisioned at the time of enacting the
statute and a further hypothesis of how the ordinance might
serve that imagined end.35 Mrs. Moore faced a Court which, just
three years prior, rejected a petitioner's claim that his funda-
mental rights of privacy and association were violated by a
zoning ordinance which based permissible occupancy of a sing-
le-family dwelling on the relationship of the inhabitants
within.3 6
However, careful analysis indicates that construing Euclid
and Belle Terre as insurmountable barriers to favorable ad-
judication in Moore would be improper.
Although zoning is a predominant issue in these cases as it is
in Moore, the case at bar additionally contains the critical fami-
ly element, a factor not materially considered by the Supreme
Court in its other zoning decisions.
In light of this fact, the Moore Court abandons Euclid and
Belle Terre as controlling37 and proceeds to explore and ulti-
32. See text pg. 566 as to the permissable legislative end found by the Court.
33. This time span is measured from Euclid (1926) to Belle Terre (1974).
34. The only instance of the Court rejecting a zoning ordinance as uncon-
stitutional was in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, see note 26 supra. The ordi-
nance was found to be irrationally related to a legitimate state end after apply-
ing the Euclid test.
35. Although this type of approach was utilized by the Supreme Court, the
lower federal court, finding for the petitioners used a sliding scale approach
similar to that developed in the dissent by Justice Marshall in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This test requires
that as the right involved becomes closer to fundamental in nature, the State
must specify the means and the goal, rather than hypothesizing the same.
36. The assertions of the petitioners in Belle Terre and that of Mrs. Moore
were nearly identical in nature, undoubtedly stemming from the restrictive
nature by which the respective cities had defined permissable single family
occupancy. See note 1 supra and note 95 infra.
37. 97 S. Ct. at 1935, "But one overriding factor sets this case apart from
Belle Terre. The ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals."
mately rely upon those decisions dealing with what is termed
the right of choice in family matters.
II. THE FAMILY AND ZONING
Moore deals with an ordinance which refuses to allow the
definition of family to encompass any relationship beyond that
of the nuclear family. Whatever may be the popular notion of a
family,3 8 each zoning ordinance has consistently attempted it-
self to define this term. Such definitions vary widely since zon-
ing ordinances are drafted locally rather than at the state level
and often display salient discrepancies in statutory language.
The typical ordinance limits certain geographical areas to resi-
dency by a single family, defining family as one related by
blood, marriage or adoption. Other ordinances similarly control
geographical areas by limiting residency to families, but define
family in terms of a single housekeeping unit.39
These differing definitions of the "family" have traditionally
caused the constitutional battles over zoning ordinances. 40
Where the city chooses to define family in terms of a blood
relationship, unrelated individuals, asserting violation of
constitutional rights in various state and district courts have
made attempts by the city in limiting occupancy to related indi-
viduals unsuccessful.41
In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner,42 the Illinois Supreme
38. Einbinder, The Legal Family, 13 J. FAMILY L. 781 (1974). Family is
derived from the Latin word 'familia'. Originally it denoted a master-servant
relationship. Gradually the master's wife was included, together with all per-
sons related to him by blood or marriage.
39. Id. at 798.
40. 97 S. Ct. at 1944.
41. Justice Stevens concurring opinion in Moore, 97 S. Ct. 1943-47, citing
these lower court decisions, emphasises the right normally associated with
property-that of an owner to decide who may reside on her property, thus
suggesting that the absence or presence of a blood relationship, or the degree of
blood relationship need not be determined in finding in favor of Mrs. Moore.
Instead Justice Stevens applies the Euclid rationale to Moore without any
apparent difficulty, and concludes that under that test, the ordinance of East
Cleveland must fail.
"The city has failed totally to explain the need for a rule which would allow a
homeowner to have two grandchildren live with her if they are brothers, but not
if they are cousins. Since this ordinance has not been shown to have any 'sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare' of the
City of East Cleveland, and since it cuts so deeply into a fundamental right
normally associated with the ownership of residential property-that of an owner
to decide who may reside on her property-it must fall under the limited standard
of review of zoning decisions which this Court preserved in City of Euclid and
Nectow, supra. Under that standard, East Cleveland's unprecedented ordi-
nance constitutes a taking of property without due process and without just
compensation." Id. at 1947.
42. 34 IlI. App. 2d 432, 216 N.E. 2d 116 (1966).
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Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting four unrelated men
from occupying a single family structure. The city's limited
definition of "family" 43 included only those related by blood,
marriage or adoption. The Trottner court emphasized the sta-
bility of the single housekeeping unit established by the unre-
lated men and concluded that the household complied with the
overall legislative intent and purpose of the ordinances in pre-
venting transient occupancy. The court commented:
The General Assembly has not specifically authorized the adoption of
zoning ordinances that penetrate so deeply as this one does into the
internal composition of a single housekeeping unit. Until it has done
so, we are of the opinion that We should not read the general authority
that it has delegated extend so far.
44
Another case invalidating ordinances requiring a blood rela-
tionship for single family occupancy is Kirsh Holding Co. v.
Borough of Manasquan.45 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
found that the Borough's attempt to deal with unruly seaside
resort vacationers by means of enforcing the blood relationship
requirement deprived the owners of their property without af-
fording fourteenth amendment guarantees. 46
Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan,4 7 however, represents a
case in which a restricted family definition was upheld. In Mor-
gan the court placed great emphasis on traditional family
values and found that a statute prohibiting "hippie" communes
was valid. The Morgan opinion not only justifies such exclu-
sionary zoning on family principles, but in a sense sets the
43. The ordinance required that family be construed as one or more per-
sons related to each other by blood marriage or adoption.
44. See note 42 at 120.
45. 59 N.J. 241, 245 A.2d 513 (1971).
46. Types of group living which have not fared well under single-family
ordinances include fraternities, City of Schenectady v. Delta Chi Fraternity, 5
App. Div. 2d 14, 168 N.Y.S. 2d 754 (1957) sororities, Cassidy v. Triebel, 337 Ill.
App. 117, 85 N.E. 2d 461 (1948), a retirement home designed for over 20 people,
Kellogg v. Joint Council of Women's Auxiliaries Welfare Assn., 265 S.W. 2d 374
(Mo. 1954), and a commercial therapeutic home for emotionally disturbed chil-
dren, Browndale International, Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182, 208
N.W. 2d 121 (1973). These institutional uses are not only inconsistent with the
single-housekeeping unit concept but include many more people then would
normally inhabit a single-family dwelling.
For further consideration of the group homes, see, Wildgren, Exclusionary
Zoning and Its Effects on Group Homes In Areas Zoned For Single-Family
Dwellings, 24 U. OF KAN. L. REV. 677 (1976).
47. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
hypothetical stage for the actual factual situation found in
Moore.
Plaintiff's are also correct in observing that a law which barred tradi-
tional families from R-1 neighborhoods might well be deemed highly
suspect. But there is a long recognized value in traditional family
relationships which does not attach to the 'voluntary family.' The tra-
ditional family is an institution reinforced by biological and legal ties
which are difficult or impossible to sunder. It plays a role in educating
and nourishing the young which, far from being 'voluntary', is often
compulsory. Finally, it has been a means for uncounted millenia, of
satisfying the deepest emotional and physical needs of human beings.
A zoning law which avoided or totally excluded traditional families
would indeed be suspect.48 (emphasis added)
Morgan seems to enunciate clearly the role of the family in the
scheme of societal life and reinforces the effect which the zon-
ing power can play in molding that certain lifestyle.
The notion of employing governmental mechanisms, how-
ever, in such a way as to promote family life, is not new. Govern-
ments sometimes try deliberately to shape family behavior in
ways they believe to be in the best interests of both the families
and society as a whole. "As social life becomes more complex
and delicately balanced, the state becomes more concerned that
families should supply it with recruits well qualified to fit into
the delicate network of social roles which compose the soci-
ety." 4
9
If the state desires to promote the family as a tool to achieve
social harmony and indoctrination of socially acceptable traits
in the young, to whom should the actual task be delegated? The
inescapable answer to this question leads one to conclude that
the job should rest upon the shoulders of the child's elders for
they themselves have undergone the same inculcation.
The ordinance involved in Moore, has, in effect, predeter-
mined the identity of the child's elders, making a legal judgment
as to the members of a family capable of handling the job of
socially developing the child.50 East Cleveland concluded that
the nuclear family was superior to the extended family. Justice
Powell strongly disapproved the city's choice, basing his dis-
48. Id. at 911.
49. BLOOD, THE FAMILY 93 (1972).
50. For an interesting discussion concerning the relationship of the State
and parents, see TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES (1971) pgs. 560-1. The author sees the scope of State power
as depending on the nature of the origin of parental authority. If such authority
is a "natural" right rather than a privilege, the state may not "arbitrarily take
the child away from the care of the parents." It seems that such a 'natural right'
is very much akin to what Meyer termed as the right to "bring up children." See
text at pg. 558.
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agreement on historical mandate and tradition:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition. Over the years mil-
lions of our citizens have grown up in just such an environment, and
most, surely, have profited from it. Even if conditions of modern
society have brought about a decline in extended family households,
they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained
over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports
a larger conception of the family.
51
East Cleveland's attempt at defining "family" in such a way as
to preserve the nuclear family therefore had the effect of dis-
rupting the extended family. East Cleveland is not unlike other
governmental units employing this somewhat inconsistent ap-
proach. Most governing bodies supposedly possess the general
ideal of promoting the family life. Unfortunately, at time these
units, be they municipal, state or federal, lose sight of the overall
goal when pursuing more specific ones. East Cleveland's ordi-
nance is representative of such a municipality.
Moore is not the first, nor is it the last, example, of this bifur-
cated approach. A classic example of a governmental agency
attempting to subvert its own social instrument was found in
Skinner v. Oklahoma.52
Justice Douglas invalidated forced sterilization of habitual
criminals. In doing so, he noted: "We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race." Similarly in Cleveland Board of Edu-
cation v. La Fleur,5 3 the court invalidated obstacles preventing
procreation among females engaged in the teaching profession.
The Moore case, like Skinner and La Fleur, supra, presents an
irony in that it represents a classic study in contradiction: a
government interferring with its own governmental interests,
i.e., preservation of the family.
54
51. 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938-39 (1977).
52. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
53. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
54. This contradiction can be better seen in the societal promotion of mar-
riage itself. While this institution is officially sanctioned, what takes place as an
interaction in the marriage relationship is a constant concern of the Court.
"Love and sexual gratification can and do exist outside of marriage and they
To better understand the implications of Moore, with respect
to the family choice doctrine and its concommitant right of
privacy, we must first analyze the cases developing this concept,
as well as those relied upon by the Moore court. Each of the
following cases present a factual situation where the activity
involved and the choice of participation therein was found by
the Supreme Court to be the exclusive domain of the family,
barring governmental interference in this particular decision-
making process.
III. CASES PRINCIPALLY RELIED ON BY THE MOORE COURT:
DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY CHOICE
Meyer v. Nebraska55 concerned a Nebraska state statute pro-
hibiting the teaching of German in either a public or private
school to persons who had not successfully passed the eighth
grade. The statute was challenged on fourteenth amendment
grounds. Whether the fourteenth amendment encompassed a
right to educate and rear one's children as the parent chose was
a question of first impression. Justice McReynolds held that
such a fundamental right was implicit in the "liberty" concept
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 He said:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration, and some
of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupation
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. (emphasis added)57
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names,58 Oregon, as
Nebraska, attempted to broadly limit the type of education
children of its state would receive rather than merely requiring
that children be educated.5 9 Pierce posed the question of the
constitutional validity of a statute which required parents or
guardians with children between the ages of eight and sixteen to
send such minors to public schools only, thereby effectively
can and do fail to exist in marriage, but this is not the point. The point is that the
state has undertaken to sponsor one institution that has at its core the love-sex
relationship. That relationship demands liberty in the practice of the sexual
act." Willington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 294 (1973).
55. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
56. See note 2, supra.
57. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
58. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
59. Meyer recognizes this later exercise of the police power as valid, 262
U.S. at 400.
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depriving such parents or guardians of any choice in the kind of
education their children would receive. Justice McReynolds
again held this type of statute violative of fourteenth amend-
ment rights as interfering ". . . with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing of children under their
control."60
Some twenty years after the Meyer and Pierce decisions, the
Supreme Court in Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts6'
dealt with an alleged violation of the state's child labor laws by
an aunt, an avowed Jehovah's Witness, who had provided her
niece with religious literature which, for a small donation, was
to be distributed by both the child and her guardian on public
streets throughout the state. A Massachusetts law prohibited
children under a specified age from selling or exercising a trade
in public streets and also prohibited any adult from furnishing
any material to a minor with knowledge that such minor intend-
ed to sell the same. The petitioner claimed that this statute was
not only violative of her first amendment guarantee of freedom
of religion, as applied to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment, but was additionally violative of her "claim of parental
right" as secured by the due process clause of the same amend-
ment.6 2
The distribution of such religious materials was considered,
by the aunt and her niece, as a type of preaching. Such preach-
ing was claimed to be part of their religious customs and beliefs.
The Court affirmed the aunt's conviction of the basis that the
ordinance was in the best interests of the state in preventing
child labor abuse,63 but recognized a parent or guardians' right
to direct the upbringing of a child within the limits of public
interest.64
60. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
61. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
62. Id. at 164.
63. Id. at 166, Justice Rutledge suggests that the parent is not to have total
control of the child and states that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in
the public interest."
64. Id. at 166-67. Examples of what the state may compel in the public
interest are cited from Prince below:
"Acting to guard the General interest in youth's well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, re-
gulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is
not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom in-
clude preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter. (emphasis added)6 5
A later decision of the Court, promulgated in the early 1970's
presented a somewhat similar factual situation as those found
in Meyer, Prince and Pierce, the nexus among all being the
right of choice in family matters.
Wisconsin v. Yoder,66 like Pierce, dealt directly with the par-
ent's right to choose the type of education his or her child would
receive. This Wisconsin statute provided for compulsory educa-
tion at a high school level in either a public or private institution.
Yoder, a follower of Amish customs as well as Amish beliefs of
community exclusion from outside influences, chose to raise
and educate his child in the Amish community after his child
had reached eighth grade level in the Wisconsin state education-
al system.
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner's claim of par-
ental right to rear children in a particular mode of religious
belief and further held this area "of conduct protected ... and
thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regu-
lations of general applicability. '67
The pre-1960 cases cited herein were to later gain major im-
portance in the landmark decision of Griswold v. Connec-
ticut,68 which would in turn have enormous inferential impact
on the expansion and application of the "family choice" doc-
trine relied on in Moore. Although all three of these early cases
dealt with differing degrees of family choice, Meyer, Prince and
Pierce would pave the way for the creation of a new fundamen-
tal right of privacy announced in Griswold.
Griswold69 involved Connecticut's attempt to prohibit the use
of contraceptive devices by making it a crime for any person to
course of conduct on religion or conscience. (But see note 66, infra). Thus, he
cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for
himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or
the latter to ill health or death."
65. Id. at 166.
66. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
67. Id. at 220.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. The Griswold decision is of such magnitude that a complete analysis of
this opinion is not possible in this casenote. Griswold will be discussed only in
terms of its impact on the right of family choice as enveloping the right of
privacy, though both at time appear to be totally intertwined. For a thorough
[Vol. 5: 547, 1978] Family Choice in Zoning
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
use "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purposes
of preventing conception.
'70
The Connecticut law was "clearly" unconstitutional, but upon
what grounds?
71
The Court was faced with the problem of not only specifying a
fundamental right to protect such an intimate relationship,7 2 but
of additionally finding a constitutional basis for creating a right
of privacy, such right not being specifically enumerated in the
constitution.
The right to rear and educate a child in the German language
or in a private institution was likewise not explicitly mentioned
in the constitution. Such rights, however, were found in both
Meyer and Pierce to exist in the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech as applied to the states by the fourteenth
amendment.73
The Court successfully determined the existence of such
rights by broadening the definition of speech to encompass
more than mere forms of verbal expression, extending protec-
tion to those areas of activity which represent the necessary
foundational framework for communication itself i.e., educa-
tion. It developed, the technique of creating ancillary implied
rights indispensible for the protection and furtherance of spe-
cifically enumerated guarantees. This was the procedural prec-
edent gleaned from Meyer and Pierce and ultimately utilized in
Griswold.
Similarly, there is no explicit mention of freedom of associa-
tion in the constitution, although this right was found to exist by
virtue of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech,
discussion of this case see, Comment, Constitutional Privacy, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
670 (1973).
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32 (rev. 1958).
71. For an interesting and informative comment on Griswold concerning
the point of view of the attorney who prepared the brief and argued the case, see
Pollack, Thomas I. Emerson Lawyer and Scholar: Ipse Custodiet Custodes, 83
YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
72. The phrase "right to privacy" was originally coined by Warrent and
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
73. Even under the strictest incorporation theory, this amendment together
with the seven following it are applied to the states via the fourteenth amend-
ment, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947).
in the decision of NAACP v. Alabama.74 That case did not deal
with speech per se, but rather with a contempt order for failure
to turn over to the state NAACP membership lists. The Court
again, however, found that the need for "privacy in one's associ-
ation"75 was implicit in the guarantee of freedom of speech if
that right were to be exercised in its fullest sense. "Without
those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less
secure."
76
The concept of "privacy" both in one's choice of expression
and associates had therefore already been found to emanate
from first amendment guarantees 77 when Griswold came be-
fore the Court. The notion itself was not new. Justice Douglas
was also to find this conception of privacy emanating from third
amendment 78 prohibitions of quartering soldiers "in any
house", from fourth amendment79 prohibitions of unreasonable
search and seizure and from fifth amendment8 ° prohibitions of
compelling a person to disclose his private thoughts which
might lead to his own incrimination. The Griswold Court rea-
soned that these specific rights evolved from the basic desire of
individuals to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion in their everyday private lives.
The Court, utilizing the procedural technique of Meyer and
Pierce and combining the elements of privacy found in the
above mentioned specifically enumerated rights designed and
fashioned a right to privacy in and of itself. The "zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,"'"
originally parasitic in nature, was now, by virtue of Griswold,
74. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
75. Id. at 462.
76. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
77. See note 74, supra.
78. "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law." U.S. CONST. amend. III, § 1.
79. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1.
80. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
81. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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an independent fundamental right which could be utilized with-
out the necessity of coming within the scope of activity of a
specifically enumerated guarantee.82
Upon closer examination, however, it can be seen that the
right of privacy still basically functions as a protectoral right.
The motive perhaps for creating such a zone of privacy in Gris-
wold may be better discerned if it is looked at with a view to
what might be termed the ulterior motive of the Court, i.e.,
protection of the family relationship. "In constructing the zone
of privacy, the Supreme Court has relied heavily on cases sug-
gesting that family life is a uniquely private enclave to be
scrupulously protected against governmental intrusion ... the
court's conclusion about the nature of constitutional privacy
may be traced to the concern with protecting family life. 8 3
Justice Douglas in Griswold was not alone in his concern for
the family. Justice Goldberg, although approaching Griswold
from a ninth amendment perspective, quotes Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,84 emphasizing the funda-
mental importance of protection of the family relationship:
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from
the sanctity of property rights. The home derives it pre-eminence as
the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so
fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the
principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right
. ,* *Of this whole 'private realm of family life' it is difficult to
imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations. 85
The Griswold Court seems to continually stress the signifi-
cance of family life by cloaking the same with the protection of
the newly created right of privacy. The right of privacy, there-
fore, may very well be given greater extension and applicability
when dealing with the family as opposed to unrelated individu-
als. It seems this right is parasitic and protectoral in nature,
rather than equal or ancillary, to the right of family choice.
86
82. See Justice Stewart's dissent, 97 S. Ct. at 1952-57.
83. Comment, Constitutional Privacy, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670, 738 (1973).
84. 367 U.S. 497, 551, 552 (1961). Poe v. Ullman additionally concerned
contraception but the merits were not decided after a finding of an absence of
any justiciable controversy.
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479, 495.
86. This may explain the Belle Terre Courts decision summarily dismissing
the petitioner's claim of violating his and other unrelated tenant's right to
privacy. 416 U.S. 7 (1974).
Although this choice is not a specifically enumerated guaran-
tee found in the constitution, its absence from that document is
not conspicuous. The need to include such a concept of family
choice possibly never arose due to the fact that the thought of a
governmental authority denying such a right was inconceivable.
In Meyer, Pierce, and Griswold, however, this possibility be-
came close to a reality necessitating the creation of a right of
privacy which "protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and traditions. '87
It is family life which illicits Griswold's zone of privacy. It lies
dormant until the family institution is challenged. There are
many facets of the family protected by this zone of privacy
other than the marital relationship. Griswold does not merely
extend to marital privacy insulating "the personal activities of
consenting adults, (but) it may be also used to shield from State
interference a parent's 'natural right' to control his children. '88
It further applies to those individuals desiring total detachment
from the family area.
Eisenstadt v. Baird89 dealt with a similar issue of contracep-
tion as did Griswold. The distinction was that, unlike the
Connecticut statute, the Massachusetts statute proscribed the
sale or dispensing of contraceptives to unmarried persons only,
in an attempt at what was "thought to be the precise accomoda-
tion necessary to escape the Griswold ruling." 90 If that were the
case, then the Massachusetts legislature had too narrowly
construed the impact of Griswold. The decision to conceive
children resolves itself into the determination of whether or not
another person will be brought into a family. It does not change
because the parents of the child are unmarried. Their privacy in
this choice is just as significant as that of a married couple, for
the result of so choosing is the same-conception.
The Court in Eisenstadt recognized the zone of privacy to
encompass this type of family choice.
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
87. 97 S. Ct. at 1933.
88. Baskin, State Intrusion Into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limi-
tations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1382, 1384-85 (1974).
89. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
90. Id. at 450.
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sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child. (emphasis added)91
Roe v. Wade 92 was a landmark case dealing with the constitu-
tionality of a Texas criminal abortion statute, making the pros-
cribing, procuring or attempt to procure an abortion, except
upon the medical advice by a licensed physician and for the
purpose of saving the mother's life, illegal.
Although Griswold seems at first to be inimical to the prob-
lem posed in Roe v. Wade, it is not. Like Eisenstadt, Roe dealt
with family choice and, once again, the zone of privacy. "Al-
though the results are divided most of these courts have agreed
that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to
cover the abortion decision..."
The outcome of Roe was fairly predictable. In reviewing the
decisions and precedents that lead to the decision in Roe v.
Wade, it becomes quite clear that given the Court's attitudes
towards the home, marriage and family during the last fifty
years, the resolution of such a socially critical issue as posed by
Roe was foreseeable. "The Court has tended to regard family
behavior and beliefs as fundamental rights that cannot be
breached except in the presence of a compelling public inter-
est."
94
The foregoing cases 95 have developed and shaped the right of
family choice. They additionally demonstrate the Court's deep
abiding concern with protecting the family unit from outside
interference. In view of the Court's attitude in this respect and
in light of the fact that the ordinance of East Cleveland had the
practical effect of abrogating the choice of family living ar-
rangements in Mrs. Moore's household, it may be somewhat
easier to appreciate the Moore Court's reasoning in refusing to
blindly treat its factual situation in the same manner as that
found in Euclid.
Living arrangements, however, had been before the Court on
91. Id. at 453.
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. Id. at 153.
94. GROSS, PRIVACY-ITs LEGAL PROTECTION 99 (1976).
95. Because other cases cited by Justice Powell were not discussed at
length, this is not to suggest that they are in any manner less important in
developing the concept of family choice.
a previous occasion in a zoning case which directly preceeded
Moore. Belle Terre did not involve blood related occupants
however, and the right of family choice was not a factor in
determining the outcome. Only in Moore does the right of fami-
ly choice96 invade the heretofore intact province of zoning. One
may see the emergence of this right by closely examining Belle
Terre for many of the same issues and arguments present in
Belle Terre are also found in Moore. Constitutional rights to
privacy and association were asserted in both, yet the results
were diametrically opposed. The basic factual difference be-
tween the two cases, however, was the presence of a blood
relationship. This factor alone is responsible for the differing
outcomes.
The petitioners in Belle Terre, six unrelated college students,
asserted that an ordinance of that community," restricting the
occupancy of a single family dwelling to only two unrelated
individuals, while placing no limit on those who could permiss-
ibly occupy the same dwelling if blood related, violated their
due process and equal protection guarantees under the four-
teenth amendment by infringing upon their rights to privacy
and association.
The court heavily emphasized Berman v. Parker9 8 and Euclid
stating that a zoning ordinance seeking to enhance the "social
habitability" of a community and its aesthetic environment is
well within the reasonable limits of the police power. Addition-
ally, the court emphasized the preservation of family values as
an allowable goal of the municipality.
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker,
supra. The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench,
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people. (emphasis added)99
The Belle Terre court, therefore, applied the constitutional
test utilized in Euclid rather than a compelling state interest,
strict scrutiny test, 10 0 after summarily dismissing petitioner's
96. See pg. 558, supra.
97. "The word 'family' as used in the ordinance means, 'one or more per-
sons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a
single houskeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons
but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping
unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to
constitute a family." 416 U.S. at 2.
98. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
99. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
100. See note 18, supra.
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claim of infringement of the rights of privacy and association. 101
"The Court was unwilling to align appellants' choices of living
arrangements with fundamental constitutional rights previous-
ly enumerated by the Supreme Court."'0 2
While the majority decision of the Belle Terre Court did not
characterize this type of association as one meriting the protec-
tion of a fundamental right, this narrow interpretation of the
applicable scope of associational freedom'013 was found to be too
constricting for Justice Marshall, who felt the associational
rights of the students were being violated.
Constitutional protection is extended, not only to modes of association
that are political in the usual sense, but also to those that pertain to the
social and economic benefit of the members. The selection of one's
living companions involves similar choices as to the emotional, social,
or economic benefits to be derived from alternative living arrange-
ments.'0
Marshall preferred the interpretation of the scope of this right
found in Moreno v. Department of Agriculture,10 a case relied
upon by Marshall in his Belle Terre dissent.
The concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Moreno, a case
101. 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
102. Comment, Recent Developments, 13 J. FAMILY L. 901 (1974).
103. See Smith, Burning the House to Roast the Pig: Unrelated Individuals
and Single Family Zoning's Blood Relation Criteria, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 138,
146 (1972).
104. 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974). Justice Marshall's dissent in Belle Terre presents
somewhat of a contradiction in thought in light of his approach in Moore, "I am
still persuaded that the choice of those who will form one's household implicates
constitutionally protected rights," seemingly to imply his approach in Moore
would be akin to that of Justice Stevens, basing constitutionality on the funda-
mental right of the property owner, rather than on the fundamental right of the
family, id. at 18. See also, supra n. 41. Then later in Belle Terre at pg. 18-9 he
asserts that the city, if it is to impose limits on unrelated persons should likewise
do the same for related individuals.
The ordinance imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the number of
persons who may live in a house, as long as they are related by marital
or sanguinary bonds-presumably no matter how distant their relation-
ship.
This language would lend itself to the same type of thought as that of Justice
Stewart's dissent, questioning the treatment of the family on an elevated plain
apart from unrelated individuals. Neither approach is taken by Justice Marshall
in Moore who joins in the judgment and a concurring opinion which predicates
constitutional invalidity of the ordinance on violation of "family choice" rights.
105. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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dealing with the exclusion of unrelated individuals from eligi-
bility in the government Food Stamp Program,"6 expanded the
scope of associational activity protected by the fourteenth
amendment to include living arrangements of non-related indi-
viduals.
As the examples indicate, these peripherral constitutional rights are
exercised not necessarily in assemblies that congregate in halls or
auditoriums but in discrete individual actions such as parents placing
a child in the school of their choice. Taking a person into one's home
because he is poor or needs help or brings happiness to the household
is of the same dignity. (emphasis added)"7
Belle Terre, therefore, when properly viewed, with respect to
its emphasis on the non-blood relationship of the student peti-
tioners is not the obstacle it may once have appeared to be for
favorable adjudication in cases such as Moore. On the contrary,
it actually paved the way for the Moore decision.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the case primarily relied upon by the
appellee, actually supports the Court's decision. The Belle Terre ordi-
nance barred only unrelated individuals from constituting a family in
a single-family zone. The Village took special care in its belief to
emphasize that its ordinance did not in any manner inhibit the choice
of related individuals to constitute a family, whether in the 'nuclear' or
'extended' form. This was because the Village perceived that choice as
one it was constitutionally powerless to inhibit. 0 8
Why were the associational and privacy rights involved in
Belle Terre almost totally ignored by that Court? The simple
and rather obvious answer is that Belle Terre dealt with unre-
lated individuals.
The right of privacy, in the constitutional sense, rather than
the right to privacy as a cause of action in tort, applies only to
related individuals. Those seeking to invalidate statutes on the
ground that it is an unlawful impairment of their constitutional
right of privacy must "qualify" as an individual who may claim
the right of family choice, for this is the only instance where the
right of privacy will extend protection, as this is the only time its
assertion will be recognized as valid, which Belle Terre well
indicates.
It was this "qualifying process" that was at issue in Moore, for
the state asserted that grandmothers had no fundamental right
to choose to live with their grandsons, that this type of blood
relationship was not of such a degree to come within the defini-
106. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Section 3(e), 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1971).
107. 413 U.S. at 527.
108. 97 S. Ct. 1942 (1977).
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tion of "family" in the same sense as that found in prior cases
dealing with family choice.
The judgment of the Court was accordingly therefore primar-
ily concerned with finding a basis upon which to bring this
choice into the family realm, thereby qualifying the extended
family equally with that of the nuclear family." 9 Once the Court
determined that the choice to live with one's uncles, aunts,
nieces, nephews, grandchildren and grandparents was a facet
of "family choice", it was foreseeable to conclude that case law
dealing with the right of privacy would be used to protect this
choice. This is true even though the right of privacy itself was
never expressly mentioned in the judgment of the Court.
This qualifying process was also impliedly at issue in Belle
Terre, but was never fully considered since the petitioners
failed to assert any family relationship, however tenuous. Their
attempt at invoking the right of privacy, therefore, was predict-
ably subject to summary dismissal. One must first assert protec-
tion of the "family," before the right of privacy can be success-
fully maintained, as there appears to be no constitutional right
to live with persons to whom one is not related." 0
The tenants in Palo Alto, supra, absent a showing of ties
through blood or adoption, were accorded no right to common
residence, just as the homosexuals in Baker v. Nelson,11' seek-
ing a marriage license in an attempt to escape the state's
sodomy law, were not.
109. The extended family situation under question in Moore was somewhat
posed in City of White Plains v. Ferrailo, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). In that case, the city precluded occupancy of a single family
residence by those individuals unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption.
Twelve children resided in the Ferrailo household, though only two of the
children were the offspring of the owners. The other ten children were "foster"
children, three of which were unrelated to each other while the other seven were
siblings. These twelve children however, had established an emotional attach-
ment to one another similar to that of siblings. The court in Ferrailo refused to
allow the city to break-up this family, due to the family ties that had been
established among the group. (For a contrary result see, Newark v. Johnson, 70
N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (1961)).
110. For comments concerning this question see, Haber, No Dogs, Cats or
Voluntary Families Allowed-Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 24 DE PAUL L.
REV. 784 (1975). Hall, An Extension of the States Police Power; The Protec-
tion of Family Values Through Zoning Legislation, 21 LOYoLA L. REV. 243
(1975).
111. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972).
In light of the above, Moore might be better understood if
analyzed with an eye to the creation of a new fundamental right
rather than a constricting interpretation of the existing right of
privacy.
IV. THE EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT OF FAMILY CHOICE:
THE CREATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
OF FAMILY ASSOCIATION
It has already been noted" 2 that when the United States Su-
preme Court deals with a fundamental right which is not explic-
itly enumerated in the constitution, a determination must be
made as to the character of the right and its origin.
The associational right involved and explored herein is not
that which was announced in NAACP v. Alabama, for that was
of a political nature; nor is it the right asserted in the concurring
opinion in Moreno, for that right was economic and social in
nature. Neither does the associational right developed in Moore
find its origin solely in the first amendment. It arises from all
those amendments utilized in creating the zone of privacy, for
that is where its foundation lies. To find the roots of this right
one need only look to the case which first announced the zone of
privacy.
The first instance of the development of family associational
rights emanating from the broader right of family choice is
found in Griswold. Justice Douglas examined the personal
right of marital privacy from an associational view point, such
being unusual as that type of activity had not before been ex-
pressly considered enveloped in the right of association."' Free-
dom of association has been constitutionally recognized be-
cause it is often indispensible to effectuation of explicit first
amendment guarantees." 4 However, Justice Douglas empha-
sized that the type of associational right involved in the mar-
riage (family) relationship is "older than the Bill of Rights" out
of which it was supposedly created.
Marriage is coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior deci-
sions. 115
112. See text pg. 561.
113. The concept of a new family associational right discussed in this case-
note is also the subject of Justice Stewart's dissent in Moore, 97 S. Ct. at 1952-57.
114. See, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964).
115. 381 U.S. at 486.
570
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All the cases mentioned by the Moore Court dealing with
family choices have set the stage for the creation or perhaps
labelling of the family associational right for they each deal
with some form of personal family association, be it with par-
ent (guardian) and child, husband and wife, mother and
conceived or unconceived fetus. Justice Powell recognized this
link between the cases, although each dealt with differing factu-
al situations then that presented by Mrs. Moore. It was the
family right to interact as a family that was the gravamen of
Moore, and all cases cited in its support.
But unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights
associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying
the force and rationale of these precedents to the family choice in-
volved in this case.116
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Moore, con-
demned the zoning practice of the City for choosing "a device
that deeply intrudes into family associational rights that his-
torically have been central, and today remain central, to a large
proportion of our population"." 7
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, likewise acknowledged that the
Moore Court had effectively broadened the definition of associ-
ational rights to include that of the family's.
To suggest that the biological fact of common ancestry necessarily
gives related persons constitutional rights of association superior to
those of unrelated persons is to misunderstand the nature of the asso-
ciational freedoms that the Constitution has been understood to pro-
tect.1 18
However misunderstood the judgment in Moore may have
been to Justice Stewart, he nevertheless conceded the attempt-
ed creation of a new fundamental right, stating that "the scope
of the associational right, until now, at least, has been limited"
to traditional protection of express first amendment rights.'
Although Moore is a plurality decision, the endeavor by the
Court to bring forth this right of family association will heavily
influence similar future cases.
It seems fitting that the creation of this particular associa-
116. 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1936-37 (1977).
117. Id. at 1941-42.
118. Id. at 1954.
119. Id.
tional right should be attempted and, hopefully, applied in fu-
ture decisions of the Court, considering the heretofore limited
application of the right of privacy to only family choice situa-
tions. If such a right could be utilized by the courts in dealing
with related individuals, who seemingly are treated differently
than non-related persons, the zone of privacy could be extended
to protect those individuals not coming within the ambit of the
"right to family choice" doctrine, as this has previously been the
key in successfully asserting the right of privacy. If the Court
would recognize its "separate but equal, single but equal" policy
regarding blood relations and non-related persons, vital rights
of those in the latter category could be protected.
CONCLUSION
Moore, therefore, stands for the proposition that the state will
not be allowed, by ordinance or otherwise, to cut "off any pro-
tection of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boun-
dary, the boundary of the nuclear family. ' 120 How far the notion
of the "family" can be extended is still uncertain. Moore has
made it clear, however, that as long as the bonds of kinship exist
within a group of related individuals, any state action infringing
upon such a relationship will be strictly scrutinized.
Perhaps, instead of beginning its inquiry at the blood relation
level with respect to permissable occupants of a household, the
state should focus its attention on the definition of a "family"
which includes unrelated individuals who share the same de-
gree of emotional ties as that of the "traditional" family. Due to
the complexities of such a determination, however, the blood
relationship continues to serve as the initial point in attempting
to define the family. If this definitional yardstick seems unjust it
is, nevertheless concededly practical. However, what is practi-
cal may not necessarily be that which is prudent.
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